

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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**THE POTENTIAL BREACH IN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THEATER
COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND SINGLE-SERVICE OPERATIONS**

by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

- Joint warfare concepts have been established as the most effective way for U.S. Armed Forces to meet challenges across the spectrum of military operations. However, in certain circumstances, single-Service operations continue as necessarily separate and distinct contributions to the joint effort.

- Joint intelligence doctrine does not include the preparation or provision of intelligence support to uni-Service operations. Therefore, single-Service operational intelligence support remains relevant within the joint intelligence structure. Fiscal constraints, however, have generated a dilemma for the Services—either pay for theater component intelligence agencies or defer support functions to theater JICs.

- The question of whether or not JICs are capable of providing support to single-Service operations yields to the fact the JIC responds foremost to the CINC's priorities. Since joint doctrine does not consistently define the responsibility of the JIC to all theater forces, especially those forces operating outside of direct joint command, a potential breach in theater component intelligence support has evolved within the joint architecture.

- Nevertheless, certain courses of action will address developing pit-falls in single-Service operational intelligence support. These include: Clarifying joint intelligence doctrine on the relationship between theater joint intelligence organizations and independent forces; redirecting Service funding towards organizations which satisfy Service-unique intelligence requirements; establishing "component cells" at the theater JICs or "theater cells" at national Service intelligence agencies which respond directly to theater component commanders and independent forces; and continuing to field information dissemination systems which provide operational commanders with access to national and theater intelligence databases.

Scenario

Your Aegis cruiser has been directed to steam immediately into the Aegean Sea to monitor large-scale Turkish and Hellenic military exercises amid inflammatory rhetoric by both sides concerning "excessive" territorial claims. National Command Authorities have expressed concern with the implications of a clash (intentional or not) which would exacerbate relations between these members of the NATO alliance. Your ship, the only platform in the Battle Group available to rapidly respond to the situation, has been sent to independently demonstrate U.S. commitment to regional stability and a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

The Battle Group Commander's Intelligence Officer has requested a tailored, periodic support message to buttress your monitoring efforts and as a force protection measure; however, there is consternation among senior staffs regarding the ability of the theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) to provide such a product. Although the concept of your mission was generated by the Joint Staff, your action is not part of a joint force effort. Therefore, the JIC's focus on geographic Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and Joint Task Force (JTF) priority intelligence requirements has predisposed their resources towards the situation in Bosnia.

This development has you concerned. How is it that an independently-operating unit receives the necessary intelligence support in the theater? What recourse do you have should you urgently require information? Will you potentially be placing your ship in harm's way with no intelligence support?

"Service skills form the very core of our combat capability. Joint warfare does not lessen Service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successful joint operations are impossible without the capabilities developed and embodied in each Service; Service "cultures," heroes, and professional standards are indispensable."

- Preface to "Joint Warfare of Armed Forces of United States" (Joint Publication 1)

Introduction

The revolution in joint warfare concepts during the past decade has brought about positive and enduring changes in the conduct of U.S. military operations. Our Armed Forces are distinguished as the most capable military in the world, providing national decision-makers with an array of decisive and flexible force deployment options to meet the broad spectrum of U.S. global commitments.

Notwithstanding the role of joint warfare concepts in enhancing our force capabilities, not all Services were proponents of the movement to shift doctrine from an intra-service to an inter-service focus. The U.S. Armed Forces, as with most military organizations, are characterized by professional conservatism and a strong adherence to established thought and tradition. It is not surprising, therefore, that the prime movers of the joint warfare "establishment" were aware sweeping dogmatic changes could only be sustained through legislative mandates. Initial military skepticism was widespread and, to some extent, still lingers. Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute the results—*Joint warfare concepts have repeatedly been proven the most sensible way for the U.S. Armed Forces to meet challenges across the spectrum of military operations, while remaining effective in an environment of scarce national resources.*

But has the zeal of "jointness" gone too far? Has the concept of joint military operations been corrupted to mean a corporate effort rather than a tailored one? Has the momentum of joint training and operations created a resistance to single-Service actions as the most effective means of achieving certain military objectives? Are we experiencing an aversion to Service expertise and cultures—often labeled as relics of a by-gone era—on the same scale as the initial resistance to jointness? Have budgetary decisions been overly-influenced by the premise that, in order to be relevant, one must be joint?

This paper will address these questions in relation to the field of military intelligence. Specifically, it will examine the possibility that today's joint environment is slowly consuming Service intelligence cultures and, in doing so, is evolving at the expense of necessary Service-unique capabilities and requirements. This paper does not endorse the duplicative tracks of the Services prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, nor does it seek to denigrate the joint intelligence concept. Rather, this study intends to point out that: (1) Joint intelligence commands must acknowledge that single-Service functions continue to be necessary and appropriate; and (2) The theater joint intelligence structure must support these uni-Service operations. This paper will conclude by outlining options to ensure such support is consistently provided to forces engaged in single-Service operations.

The Purpose of Joint Warfare

Intelligence is identified as one component of the "operational functions" of warfare.¹ It is therefore appropriate to first discuss the doctrinal essence of joint warfare as a precursor to discussing joint intelligence principles:

¹ Milan N. Vego, "Operational Functions," Unpublished Paper, Operational Art, NWC 4025, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1995, 1, 10-15.

- "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. *This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation.* Joint force commanders choose the capabilities they need from the . . . forces at their disposal . . . Joint warfare is team warfare."² [emphasis added]

- "The goal [of joint military operations] is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, *not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally.*"³ [emphasis added]

Hence, the joint warfare concept, as indicated by the "team" definition, is based upon the ideal that selected capabilities are drawn from the aggregate force in order to achieve an objective in the most efficient, effective and appropriate manner. Much like the tenet of centralized command and decentralized execution, *joint command does not necessarily translate into joint execution.* A joint force is designed to provide the commander with a pool of resources and capabilities from which to choose the most suitable option(s). Not all force components can be guaranteed involvement in each military operation, nor should they.

Are Single-Service Operations Still Relevant?

The theme of this paper is based on the continued existence in the joint environment of military actions in which only one Service is equipped and trained to accomplish. These operations are not "sacred cow" relics of the Cold War era, but endure as recognized single-Service contributions to the joint force effort. While these uni-Service operations fall under the command authority of a geographic Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Service chiefs and geographic

² U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington: 1995), i.

³ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Washington: 1995), 29.

components commanders are tasked with directing all operational and tactical aspects of planning, training and support. Therefore, once the decision to conduct a single-Service operation is made at the theater-strategic level, any aspect of jointness ends; it becomes a Service action from start to finish.

Many examples of the aforementioned command relationship can be found among the U.S. Navy's daily contributions to the national military strategies of overseas presence and power projection,⁴ to include carrier battle group and submarine deployments, undersea warfare, "gunboat diplomacy," the Freedom of Navigation program, and foreign port visits. This broad scope of unique functions, as well as the traditional autonomy of naval operations, is often attributed as the reason for the Navy's reputed obstinacy to joint warfare. However, the Navy is not alone in uni-Service missions. The Air Force stands alone in stealth aviation, deep-strike operations and long-range tanker support. Unlike operations or functions which span Service capabilities, these *uni-Service operations contribute to the joint effort while remaining necessarily separate and distinct.*

Joint force oversight of multi-Service functions, such as planning processes, targeting procedures and communications architectures, represents the strength of the joint effort. Coordinated action within these functional areas ensures both a militarily effective and fiscally responsible way of doing business. By their nature, joint organizations are not customarily staffed with the expertise to provide support to the Service-unique roles outlined above. It then becomes necessary that component commands be tasked to provide such support. This deferral does not indicate a weakness in the joint warfare concept. What it does reflect is the function apropos of a joint organization—oversight of trans-Service issues and delegation of Service-specific issues.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: 1995, 6-7.

The Purpose of Joint Intelligence

As intelligence is described as "the basis of operations,"⁵ it is important that the tenets of joint intelligence reflect those of joint warfare in general:

- Joint intelligence is "intelligence produced by elements of *more than one Service* of the same nation."⁶ [emphasis added]
- Joint intelligence doctrine embodies "fundamental principles that guide the preparation of intelligence and the subsequent provision of intelligence to support military forces of *two or more Services* employed in coordinated action."⁷ [emphasis added]

These definitions clearly reflect the simple ideal of joint warfare. That is to say joint warfare is team warfare; therefore, joint intelligence is team intelligence. Accordingly, one can infer that *the doctrinal concept of joint intelligence does not include the preparation or provision of intelligence support to uni-Service operations*. To suggest otherwise would expand the bounds of a joint intelligence organization beyond its intended scope and, in doing so, assume responsibilities which the organization may not be manned or qualified to accomplish. This reality is not an indictment of joint intelligence capabilities, but rather a sensible division of labor to best meet multi-Service and uni-Service support requirements.

Is Single-Service Intelligence Support Still Relevant?

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-0, Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (Washington: 1995), III-1.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military Associated Terms (Washington: 1995), 203.

⁷ *Ibid*, 203.


Based upon the definitions discussed in the previous section, it is clear that *there is still a vital role for direct, single-Service operational intelligence support within the joint intelligence structure*. However, a major point of contention focuses on which command echelon is responsible for providing such support. Herein lies the essence of the contemporary debate: At what level of command are single-Service operations considered relevant enough to ensure associated intelligence requirements are satisfied? In reality, a good way to quantify the relevance of any commodity to a command is to determine the willingness of the command to allocate competing resources to ensure the commodity is maintained. Therefore, the question might be rephrased as: What level of command is willing to pay for continued operational intelligence support to single-Service missions?⁸ In order to fully discuss this issue, one must examine general categories of theater intelligence architectures, related budgetary considerations, and the success these various architectures may have supporting operational forces.

Theater Intelligence Organizations

Figure (1) depicts the interaction between military intelligence commands—both joint and Service—in support of theater forces. Joint and Service theater intelligence organizations (highlighted in gray) provide a direct support chain (as indicated by the solid line) for their respective joint and single-Service forces. Additionally, joint and component forces may derive supplemental intelligence support from their "sister" intelligence commands (as indicated by the dashed lines), even though each organization is focused on the needs of their respective commanders. Much as single-Service operations contribute to the joint effort, single-Service intelligence support products contribute to the joint intelligence effort. This type of relationship, often termed a confederated architecture, is optimal for many reasons. First, it includes a theater

⁸ The term "operational intelligence" refers to intelligence support at the operational level of war. The Navy uses the misnomer operational intelligence (OpIntel) in reference to support provided by intelligence fusion centers to deployed tactical units.

joint intelligence command. Second, it maintains an intelligence structure which mirrors the command structure; therefore, component intelligence commands are able to directly respond to their commanders' priority intelligence requirements.




Third, a logical sequence of strategic (national), operational (theater) and tactical (force) intelligence functions is retained. The singular problem with this architecture is that critics view the existence of separate intelligence commands as duplicative and, therefore, unnecessary. This reasoning found its place with enough Congressional and Service budgeteers that the number of theater component intelligence agencies has been drastically reduced since the introduction of the theater JIC concept five years ago. Most component intelligence commands have either been subsumed into the JIC organization or dissolved altogether.

In order to further discuss this issue, a brief description of the two main sources of military intelligence funding is necessary. One source is the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). This program, under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), funds the majority of DoD and joint intelligence activities. Another budgeting source is the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program. This program, executed by DoD, funds the majority of Service tactical intelligence platforms and services necessarily acquired outside the

GDIP.⁹ Simply put, GDIP is DCI money for the Defense and Joint communities and TIARA is DoD money for the Service communities. Once the theater JICs were established in 1991 (under GDIP funding), many Services saw an easy way to maintain intelligence support without having to continue funding their theater component intelligence organizations under TIARA. This would be accomplished by allowing the theater component intelligence commands to be absorbed by the theater JIC. Under the pressure of fiscal austerity, it was easy to think one was getting something for nothing. However, in doing so, most Services relinquished their direct influence in determining exactly what that something was going to be.

Figure (2) depicts the interaction between national and theater intelligence organizations without theater component intelligence commands. With the theater JIC (highlighted in gray) being the principal intelligence organization, functions previously assigned to the theater component intelligence commands are either assumed by the theater JIC or by the component commander's intelligence staff. This type of relationship, termed an integrated architecture, has many advantages. First, the notion of an overarching joint establishment which, in concept, provides the commensurate quality and quantity of intelligence support as that provided by the confederated architecture is particularly attractive to budgetary overseers. Second, the ability of the JIC to establish common



⁹ Daryl L. Chapman, Intelligence Planning, Programming and Budgeting (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1988), 17-30.

procedures for theater intelligence planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination facilitates a unity of effort. Third, establishing the JIC as the theater focal point simplifies the process for forwarding operational force Requests For Information (RFIs). However, there are also disadvantages to this architecture which must be considered. First, independent component forces do not have a clear-cut support chain (note the break in the "direct support" solid line). Current intelligence services could be provided from either the component commander's staff, or the theater JIC; however, such disparate relationships are often haphazard, unresponsive or redundant. Second, the dichotomy between command relationships and the theater intelligence structure may undermine a component commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). Third, unless the JIC establishes a mechanism providing operational intelligence support to single-Service operations, a void develops in intelligence support between the strategic and tactical levels of warfare.

Both the confederated and integrated architectures have strengths and weaknesses. However, the current fiscal environment has brought about one simple truth for military intelligence at the operational level of war: *Unless the Services are willing to pay for independent component intelligence support organizations by consistently allocating their own funds (TIARA), the theater JIC will endure as the sole organization in a position to provide such support.* The essential question is: Can the JIC live up to this responsibility?

The Crucible of Joint Intelligence Concepts - The Theater JIC

It is interesting to note that while the five geographic JICs were established under the same DoD initiative,¹⁰ each is uniquely structured—representing various points of the spectrum

¹⁰ Secretary of Defense memorandum 15 March 1991, "Strengthening Defense Intelligence."

between confederated and integrated architectures.¹¹ Despite any variations, an underlying question within each JIC is the extent to which it is responsible for providing intelligence to theater component commands, especially those conducting single-Service operations. Viewpoints might range from: "The JIC is the theater intelligence center and, therefore, is responsible for addressing *all intelligence requirements within the theater*" (the "omni-theater" position) to "The JIC is the theater's joint force intelligence center and is responsible for addressing *only joint force intelligence requirements in the theater*" (the "joint only" position). This dichotomy is not only a matter of opinion, but accurately reflects the discord among JIC functions outlined throughout keystone joint doctrine publications. Essentially, doctrinal elements exist to suit either position. From the "omni-theater" aspect:

- "at the theater/regional level, the JIC is the principal element for ensuring effective intelligence support for combatant commanders and *theater forces*."¹² [emphasis added]
- "The JIC concept fuses the main support capabilities of all Service, Combat Support Agency, and combat units into a *one-stop shopping center* for intelligence support . . . [with the responsibility to] coordinate support from other intelligence organizations *above and below its echelon*."¹³ [emphasis added]

From the "joint only" aspect:

- "the JIC (is) the primary intelligence organization providing support to *joint warfighting* at all levels."¹⁴ [emphasis added]
- "The combatant command's JIC ensures the intelligence needs of the command and subordinate *joint force commands* are satisfied."¹⁵ [emphasis added]

¹¹ Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Support to Warfighters: Responding to a Changing Environment, Phase I: Assessment of Joint Intelligence Center Functions (Washington: 1992), 2-4, B-3 to B-10, B-14 to B-25.

¹² Joint Pub 2-0, xi.

¹³ Ibid, xi, VII-7.

¹⁴ Ibid, xi, VII-7.

- "Service *Component Commanders* . . . provide intelligence support to meet the operational requirements of the *component* and the identified requirement of other components and the joint command."¹⁶ [emphasis added]

- "Responsibility for *specific intelligence support* within joint forces may be assigned to the *component* best able to perform the function."¹⁷ [emphasis added]

Skeptics will contend the theater JIC's support posture towards independent component requirements is moot since each component has the option to "task" the JIC to provide the needed services. Certainly this is an option, but the assurance that the necessary action will be taken within the context of the theater's taskings is about as certain as the outcome of any subordinate's "tasking" to a senior command. *The simple fact is that the JIC responds to the CINC's priorities* as articulated by the J2. In unified operations, this does not result in significant disparities since there is overlap among CINC and component requirements. However, in the case of single-Service operations, component commanders' requirements are secondary to the CINC's joint requirements. Joint doctrine underscores this point: "Theater JICs are organized in accordance with *geographic combatant commander prerogatives* . . . and can expand or contract based on *command* intelligence . . . requirements."¹⁸ [emphasis added]

It is not the position of this author that the JIC's deference to the CINC is anything but absolutely proper and necessary—after all, the geographic commander is the reason why the JIC exists in the first place. But, Service decision-makers must also avoid being lulled into the notion that the JIC will be a budgetary umbrella for "business as usual." In reality, despite all good intentions and any understandings that Service billets absorbed by the JIC will be directed at

¹⁵ Ibid, x.

¹⁶ Ibid, V-8.

¹⁷ Ibid, V-7.

¹⁸ Ibid, VII-11,12.

component requirements, joint organizational dynamics will eventually lead to these billets being swallowed by JFC and JTF commitments—at the expense of single-Service requirements.

The bottom line is that *joint doctrine does not outline a consistent representation of the relationship between the JIC and all theater forces, especially those operating outside of direct joint command*. Hence, Congressional and community budgeteers may simply pick whichever position (omni-theater or joint only) accommodates their own funding preferences. While this doctrinal schism may serve a purpose by providing convenient flexibility to these decision-makers, its most notable impact is the operational disparity it creates for deployable forces. To underscore this point, consider the case of East coast naval forces deploying to the Persian Gulf region. These units will "work-up" under USACOM, transit under USEUCOM and eventually be assigned to USCENTCOM -- with all three theaters comprised of different intelligence architectures and varying component support elements.¹⁹ What may be considered by some as trivial inconsistencies among theater intelligence support structures, quickly translates into a serious deficiency when transitioning among geographic CINC theaters during a crisis -- such as the October 1994 deployment of the USS George Washington and elements of its battle group to the Gulf in response to Saddam Hussein's movement of two Republican Guards divisions towards the Kuwaiti border. Real-world contingencies are not the time to learn and orient to the theater intelligence architecture; mobile forces require consistent "points of entry" for PIRs, regardless of the theater of operations.

In addition to the short-term impact of expanding joint establishments at the expense of dedicated support to uni-Service operations, there is also the long-term effect of jointness on Service intelligence cultures and expertise. As more intelligence organizations are structured in

¹⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Intelligence Architecture: Theater JIC," no. 40741-00720, 15 March 1991. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System, NTIC Series A, September 1995.

the image of joint staffs, Service-unique skills are susceptible to neglect. As an example, a major concern within the Naval Intelligence Community is the "potential . . . future loss of . . . dedicated and specialized support for naval operations" as the theater JICs with integrated architectures "continue to retain this important . . . discipline within the joint support arena."²⁰

Are There Feasible Solutions?

The crux of this study is not only to articulate the need for single-Service intelligence support, but also to outline options for ensuring such support is consistently provided to independently-operating forces -- regardless of the theater architecture.

Clarify Joint Intelligence Doctrine

The existing Intelligence keystone doctrine, Joint Publication 2-0, hinders the provision of support to independent component operations by not clearly articulating the roles and responsibilities of joint organizations to component commanders beyond the joint effort. Granted, a detailed discussion of this relationship may be inappropriate for a joint publication; however, in theaters where the integrated joint architecture has been levied upon the Service components—regardless of daily support requirements outside of joint operations—the ramifications deserve at least a cursory mention. The existing doctrine implies that all operations will be joint; therefore, its principles apply universally. While unified action is appropriately the essence of U.S. military force planning, its role as the foundation for planning does not necessarily translate into a joint force execution of these plans. Joint intelligence doctrine must acknowledge

²⁰ RADM E.D. Shaefer, Jr., "Statement," U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Intelligence Issues, 5 February 1992 Hearing (Washington: U.S. Govt Print. Off., 1992), 82-83.

the existence of single-Service operations and consider the necessary support implications. A simple rectification would address the following question: It is clear what the responsibilities of independently-operating components are to support the joint force, but what are the responsibilities of the joint force to support the independently-operating components? Defining this relationship, as a policy, is necessary before any practical measures towards establishing consistent and cohesive architectures can be implemented.


Redirect TLARA Funding

The nature of the TIARA program puts the "intelligence support" element of funding at a disadvantage for many reasons. Foremost, the majority of Service funding is stovepiped into warfare communities. As a result, most of the money is allocated to intelligence-related systems rather than analytical support services. While each warfare specialty benefits from theater component intelligence organizations, none are called upon to contribute funding to ensure such organizations continue to exist. Additionally, the uncertainty of TIARA funding levels makes budget planners hesitant to commit to funding entire intelligence commands since, in fiscally austere times, other programs may have to be completely shut down (hence, the inclination of the Services to embrace the GDIP panacea).²¹ What is needed is for each Service to conduct a bona fide introspection of its intelligence needs and then determine how these requirements are being fulfilled by existing organizations. In those areas where single-Service operations are not receiving the desired level of intelligence support, the Services must, as a priority, commit a consistent level of TIARA funding to fill the gaps. This funding could be directed to any of the two following proposals.

²¹ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, *Intelligence Support to Warfighters: Responding to a Changing Environment, Phase 2: Building the Military Intelligence Base Force* (Washington: 1992), 11.

Establish Theater JIC Component Cells


Theater JICs could establish adjunct groups which incorporate the functions of independent theater component intelligence commands. Figure (3) depicts how a theater JIC with dedicated "component cells" (highlighted in gray) would interact with component commands. Note, in addition to routine support to the component commander, direct support to operational forces could be tasked as necessary (as reflected in the array of solid lines). The scope of these cells would be defined by the theater component commanders, with the approval of the geographic CINC. Once established, majority funding of these adjuncts would be the responsibility of the component commander—thereby ensuring that each cell responds to the requirements of their



respective commander and, conversely, that each commander is willing to allocate money to receive the requisite support. This option unites all the advantages of the confederated and integrated architectures: The economy of a "single roof," procedural unity, a single point of entry for RFIs, corresponding intelligence and command structures, and a means to address Service-unique PIRs. In summary, the unity of purpose and effort within a single joint organization is maintained; however, a mechanism for responding to the needs of individual component commanders is also established.

Establish National Service Intelligence Agency Theater Cells

Should there be a lack of consensus on the need for theater JIC component cells, another option that national Service intelligence organizations could establish dedicated support cells to augment the theater JICs. Figure (4) depicts how these "theater cells" would interact with component commands. Similar to the theater JIC component cell concept, a mechanism for direct support to both the component commander and operational forces is provided. The main advantage of the theater cell concept over the component cell concept is that it probably represents the "quickest fix" to ensure a sufficient level of support is being provided to deployed forces. In addition, since theater support cells would not be a permanent fixture of the theater joint structure, adjustments in their sizing would be independent of the theater bureaucracy—the only impact on the JIC would



be the level of support received by theater forces. Moreover, the collocation of support assets at a national facility would allow for a rapid redirection of manning and effort to requisite theaters—a capability with particular importance in a scenario of developing regional contingencies. Nevertheless, the main disadvantage of the theater cell concept is that the by-pass of support responsibilities outside of the theater could detract from the geographic CINC's unified effort. Likewise, the decision to divert resources from one theater cell to another would likely reflect the decisions of the national Service agency's management, vice the operational requirements of the theater component commanders.

Field "User Pull" Information Dissemination Systems

The revolution in information dissemination systems offers a potential stopgap to some of the shortcomings outlined in this study. One consideration is to replicate the capabilities of a theater component intelligence organization by staging versatile command information systems at an operational commander's headquarters/flagship. Using the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) as the communications "pipeline" for the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), worldwide databases and imagery file servers could be made available to uni-Service tactical intelligence organizations who would have the ability to extract pertinent data and locally generate the support services normally expected of theater-level intelligence organization. This option has some merit, but its technical nature does not adequately address the "human aspect" of support functions. Shortcomings would persist in the areas of regional expertise and consistency of support with rotating units. Robust information dissemination systems offer a significant back-up and synergistic capability for intelligence organizations, but it is highly unlikely such systems could totally replace the contributions of theater component intelligence commands.

Conclusion

Joint warfare concepts have been established as the most effective way for U.S. Armed Forces to meet challenges across the spectrum of military operations, while remaining relevant in an environment of declining resources. However, the fundamental principle of joint command does not invariably translate into joint force execution of all military actions. In certain circumstances, single-Service operations continue as necessarily separate and distinct contributions to the joint effort.

Fiscal constraints have significantly reduced the willingness of the Services to pay for theater component intelligence commands with Service funds. Moreover, joint intelligence doctrine does not consistently address the preparation or provision of intelligence support to uni-Service operations. The result is that theater JICs have evolved into the principal organizations capable of providing support to single-Service operations; however, this responsibility has developed without clear guidance on the role of such support within the joint intelligence structure.

The JIC responds foremost to the CINC's priorities. Therefore, depending upon the overlap of CINC and component commanders' requirements, the competition for intelligence resources has the potential to lower the priority of many components' requirements by default. Since joint doctrine does not consistently define the responsibility of the JIC to forces operating outside of direct joint command, a potential breach in theater component intelligence support has evolved within the joint architecture.

A sequence of actions to address joint and Service shortcomings may help elude the developing pit-falls in single-Service operational intelligence support. These steps include:

- Clarifying joint intelligence doctrine by outlining the relationship between theater joint intelligence organizations and forces operating independently of a joint force commander.
- Conducting a thorough review of Service-unique intelligence needs and organizations which satisfy these requirements. Should deficiencies exist in the support provided, redirect consistent Service funding towards either of the following proposals:
 - - Component cells at the theater JICs, which respond principally to the theater component commander and independently-operating forces.

- - Theater cells at national-service intelligence agencies, which would augment JIC support to theater component commanders and independent forces.

- Continuing to field highly-capable information dissemination systems to provide operational commanders with access to national and theater intelligence databases.

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